Ulysses S. Grant
In 1877, right after leaving the presidency, Ulysses S. Grant took a trip around the world accompanied by New York Herald reporter John Russell Young. The most eventful stopovers may have been in China and Japan. Grant was in Peking meeting with Prince Kung, the Prince-Regent of China when they had this exchange over dim sum. Prince Kung began with pleasantries:
Prince Kung spoke of his anxiety to have General Grant remain longer in China. China, he said, had always been treated well by America, and never more so than under the administration of General Grant…
Grant explained his approach to foreign policy:
General Grant responded that the policy of America in dealing with foreign powers was one of justice. “We believe,” he said, “that fair play, consideration for the rights of others, and respect for international law will always command the respect of nations and lead to peace. I know of no other consideration that enters into our foreign relations. There is no temptation to the United States to adventures outside of our own country. Even in the countries contiguous to our own we have no foreign policy except so far as it secures our own protection from foreign interference.”
Prince Kung
Prince Kung had a specific wish:
He explained that there was a question pending between China and Japan about the sovereignty of the Loochoo Islands, and the attempt of the Japanese to extinguish the kingdom, which had always paid tribute to China, which had always been friendly, and, according to the Prince, had been seized by Japan and absorbed into the Japanese empire. The Prince continued by expressing a feeling of delicacy at referring to a mere matter of business on the occasion of General Grant’s visit to Pekin, and said that he would not have ventured upon the subject but for the fact that the Viceroy of Tientsin had written him of the kind manner in which he had received the Viceroy’s allusions to the matter.
Grant qualified his participation:
General Grant said that while he was only a traveler, seeing sights and looking at new manners and customs, that he would, upon going to Japan, take pleasure in informing himself on the subject and conversing with the Japanese authorities. “I have no idea,” said the General, “what their argument is. They, of course, have an argument. I do not suppose that the rulers are inspired by a desire wantonly to injure China. I will acquaint myself with the Chinese side of the case, as your Imperial Highness and the Viceroy have presented it, and promise to present it. I will do what I can to learn the Japanese side. Then, if I can in conversation with the Japanese authorities do anything that will be a service to the cause of peace, you may depend upon my good offices. But, as I have said, I have no knowledge on the subject, and no idea what opinion I may entertain when I have studied it.”
On the trip over to Japan, Grant discussed Bobby Lee:
I never ranked Lee as high as some others of the army,” said the General, “that is to say, I never had as much anxiety when he was in my front as when Joe Johnston was in front. Lee was a good man, a fair commander, who had everything in his favor. He was a man who needed sunshine. He was supported by the unanimous voice of the South; he was supported by a large party in the North; he had the support and sympathy of the outside world. All this is of an immense advantage to a general. Lee had this in a remarkable degree. Everything he did was right. He was treated like a demi-god. Our generals had a hostile press, lukewarm friends, and a public opinion outside. The cry was in the air that the North only won by brute force; that the generalship and valor were with the South. This has gone into history, with so many other illusions that are historical. Lee was of a slow, conservative, cautious nature, without imagination or humor, always the same, with grave dignity. I never could see in his achievements what justifies his reputation. The illusion that nothing but heavy odds beat him will not stand the ultimate light of history. I know it is not true. Lee was a good deal of a head-quarters general; a desk general, from what I can hear, and from what his officers say. He was almost too old for active service the best service in the field. At the time of the surrender he was fifty-eight or fifty-nine and I was forty-three. His officers used to say that he posed himself, that he was retiring and exclusive, and that his head-quarters were difficult of access. I remember when the commissioners came through our lines to treat, just before the surrender, that one of them remarked on the great difference between our head-quarters and Lee’s. I always kept open house at head-quarters, so far as the army was concerned.
The Meiji Emperor
Once he arrived in Tokyo, Grant was presented to the Meiji Emperor on the Fourth of July and given a signal honor as the first Westerner of any consequence to visit Japan:
Our party slowly advanced, the Japanese making a profound obeisance, bending the head almost to a right angle with the body. The royal princes formed in line near the Emperor, along with the princesses. The Emperor stood quite motionless, apparently unobservant or unconscious of the homage that was paid him…The face expressed no feeling whatever, and but for the dark, glowing eye, which was bent full upon the General, you might have taken the imperial group for statues…The solemn etiquette that pervaded the audience chamber was peculiar, and might appear strange to those familiar with the stately but cordial manners of a European court. But one must remember that the Emperor holds so high and so sacred a place in the traditions, the religion, and the political system of Japan that even the ceremony of today is so far in advance of anything of the kind ever known in Japan that it might be called a revolution.
His Imperial Majesty…advanced and shook hands with General Grant. This seems a trivial thing to write down, but such a thing was never before known in the history of Japanese majesty. Many of these details may appear small, but we are in the presence of an old and romantic civilization, slowly giving way to the fierce, feverish pressure of European ideas, and you can only note the change in those incidents which would be unnoticed in other lands. The incident of the Emperor of Japan advancing toward General Grant and shaking hands becomes a historic event of consequence, and as such I note it. The manner of the Emperor was constrained, almost awkward, the manner of a man doing a thing for the first time, and trying to do it as well as possible. After he had shaken hands with the General, he returned to his place, and stood with his hand resting on his sword, looking on at the brilliant, embroidered, gilded company as though unconscious of their presence.
The Emperor wished to have a personal interview with Grant, another unprecedented event. The first question was on representative government:
General Grant said that this question seemed to be the only one about which there was much feeling in Japan, the only one he had observed. It was a question to be considered with great care. No one could doubt that governments became stronger and nations more prosperous as they became representative of the people. This was also true of monarchies, and no monarchs were as strong as those who depended upon a parliament. No one could doubt that a legislative system would be an advantage to Japan, but the question of when and how to grant it would require careful consideration. That needed a clearer knowledge of the country than he had time to acquire. It should be remembered that rights of this kind—rights of suffrage and representation once given could not be withdrawn. They should be given gradually. An elective assembly, to meet in Tokio, and discuss all questions with the Ministry might be an advantage. Such an assembly should not have legislative power at the outset. This seemed to the General to be the first step. The rest would come as a result of the admirable system of education which he saw in Japan.
Grant sympathized with the Japanese’s inability to implement the One True Strategy:
“Nothing,” said the General, “has been of more interest to me than the study of the growth of European and foreign influence in Asia. When I was in India I saw what England had done with that empire. I think the British rule is for the advantage of the Indian people. I do not see what could take the place of British power but anarchy. There were some things to regret, perhaps, but a great deal to admire in the manner in which India was governed. But since I left India I have seen things that made my blood boil, in the way the European powers attempt to degrade the Asiatic nations. I would not believe such a policy possible. It seems to have no other aim than the extinction of the independence of the Asiatic nations. On that subject I feel strongly, and in all that I have written to friends at home I have spoken strongly. I feel so about Japan and China. It seems incredible that rights which at home we regard as essential to our independence and to our national existence, which no European nation, no matter how small, would surrender, are denied to China and Japan. Among these rights there is none so important as the right to control commerce. A nation’s life may often depend upon her commerce, and she is entitled to all the profit that can come out of it. Japan especially seems to me in a position where the control of her c0mmerce would enable her statesmen to relieve the people of one great burden the land-tax. The effect of so great a tax is to impoverish the people and limit agriculture. When the farmer must give a half of his crop for taxes he is not apt to raise more than will keep him alive. If the land-tax could be lessened, I have no doubt that agriculture would increase in Japan, and the increase would make the people richer, make them buy and consume more, and thus in the end benefit commerce as well. It seems to me that if the commerce of Japan were made to yield its proportion of the revenue, as the commerce of England and France and the United States, this tax could be lessened.
Grant warned against another source of European oppression:
General Grant said that there was nothing which Japan should avoid more strenuously than incurring debts to European nations. So long as the government borrowed from its own people it was well. But loans from foreign powers were always attended with clanger and humiliation. Japan could not go into a European money market and make a loan that would be of an advantage to her. The experience of Egypt was a lesson. Egypt was allowed to borrow right and left, to incur an enormous debt. The result is that Egypt has been made a dependency of her creditors. Turkey owed much of her trouble to the same cause. A country like Japan has all the money she wants for her own affairs, and any attempt to bring her into indebtedness to foreign powers would only be to lead her into the abyss into which Egypt has fallen.
Grant then raised the issue the Chinese had asked him to bring up with the Japanese government:
When he was in China he had been requested by the Prince Regent and the Viceroy of Tientsin to use his good offices with the Japanese government on the question of Loochoo. The matter was one about which he would rather not have troubled himself, as it belonged to diplomacy and governments, and he was not a diplomatist and not in government. At the same time he could not ignore a request made in the interest of peace. The General said he had read with great care and had heard with attention all the arguments on the Loochoo question from the Chinese and Japanese sides. As to the merits of the controversy, it would be hardly becoming in him to express an opinion. He recognized the difficulties that surrounded Japan. But China evidently felt hurt and sore. She felt that she had not received the consideration due to her. It seemed to the General that his Majesty should strive to remove that feeling, even if in doing so it was necessary to make sacrifices. The General was thoroughly satisfied that China and Japan should make such sacrifices as would settle all questions between them, and become friends and allies, without consultation with foreign powers. He had urged this upon the Chinese government, and he was glad to have the opportunity of saying the same to the Emperor. China and Japan are now the only two countries left in the East capable, through their resources, of becoming great, that are even partially independent of European dictation and laws. The General wished to see them both advance to entire independence, with the power to maintain it. Japan is rapidly approaching such a position, and China had the ability and the intelligence to do the same thing.
Grant returned to the previous theme of the need for the Japanese to avoid inviting foreign intervention:
General Grant said he could not speak too earnestly to the Emperor on this subject, because he felt earnestly. He knew of nothing that would give him greater pleasure than to be able to leave Japan, as he would in a very short time, feeling that between China and Japan there was entire friendship. Other counsels would be given to his Majesty, because there were powerful influences in the East fanning trouble between China and Japan. One could not fail to see these influences, and the General said he was profoundly convinced that any concession to them that would bring about war would bring unspeakable calamities to China and Japan. Such a war would bring in foreign nations, who would end it to suit themselves. The history of European diplomacy in the East was unmistakable on that point. What China and Japan should do is to come together without foreign intervention, talk over Loochoo and other subjects, and come to a complete and friendly understanding. They should do it between themselves, as no foreign power can do them any good.
Iwakura Tomomi
Grant continued to mediate over the Ryukyus and then it was time to leave. This is the gist of his last conversation with Iwakara, one of the Emperor’s chief ministers:
Other questions arose questions connected with the industrial and agricultural advancement of Japan. The General pointed out to his Japanese friends the large area of fertile land awaiting cultivation, and how much might be added to the wealth and revenues of the country if the people were induced to develop the whole territory. This led to a discussion of the land tax, so heavy a burden to the people, and which the government is compelled to impose for revenue. If, instead of taxes on land the authorities could levy a tariff for revenue such a tariff as we see in Germany and France then the tax on land could be abated. This led up to the revision of the treaties, the absorbing question in Japanese politics, and which is no further advanced than it was when Mr. Iwakura went to the treaty powers on his mission many years ago. The General has always given the same advice on the treaty question. One of the odd phases of the English policy in the East is, that while England allows her own colonies to do as they please in tariffs, to have free-trade or protection, she insists that Japan and China shall arrange their imposts and tariffs solely with the view of helping English trade. In other words, Japan, an independent power, is under a duress that Canada or Australia would never accept. This anomalous condition of affairs will exist so long as the treaty remains, and England has never shown an inclination to consent to any abrogation of her paramount rights under the treaty. General Grant’s advice has been that Japan should make a statement of her case to the world. She should show the circumstances under which this treaty was made and how her ignorance was used to put her in an unfortunate and humiliating position. She should recall her own extraordinary progress in accepting and absorbing the modern civilization; that in doing this she has opened her empire to modern enterprise, and shown the best evidence of her desire to be friendly with the world. She should recount the disadvantages under which this treaty places her not alone moral, but material, crippling and limiting her resources. She should announce that the treaty was at an end, but that she was prepared to sign the most favorable conventions that could be devised, provided the treaty powers recognized her sovereign, independent rights. She should at the same time proclaim her tariff, open her ports and the interior of her country, welcome foreign capital, foreign immigration, foreign labor, and assert her sovereignty.
Lord Beaconsfield
The objection to this in the minds of the Japanese is that fleets may come, and the English may bombard Tokio as they did Simonoseki.” If there is one thing more certain than another,” reasoned the General, ” it is that England is in no humor to make war upon Japan for a tariff. I do not believe that under any circumstances Lord Beaconsfield would consent to such an enterprise. He has had two wars, neither of which have commended themselves to the English people. An Englishman does not value the glory that comes from Afghan and Zulu campaigns. To add to these a demonstration against Japan, because she had resolved to submit no longer to a condition bordering on slavery, would arouse against Lord Beaconsfield a feeling at home that would cost him his government. “Just now,” the General advised, “is the best time. Lord Beaconsfield must soon go to the people. His Parliament is coming to an end, and even if he had adventurous spirits in his cabinet or in the diplomatic service disposed to push Japan, he would be compelled to control them. Japan has a great many friends in England who are even now making her cause their own, and who would support her when she was right. More than all, there is a widespread desire for justice and fair play in England, to which the Eastern nations, and especially Japan, need never appeal in vain. Japan has peculiar claims upon the sympathy and respect of mankind, and if she would assert her sovereign rights she would find that her cause met the approval of mankind.”
Grant’s visit had a lasting impact:
General Grant’s visit to Japan is largely forgotten today, but it was not without significance at the time. The New York Times quoted an 1880 Tokyo correspondent who noted that Grant was “an unseen attendant at every council board, an invisible, but influential, participator in every cabinet meeting” in Japan.
History provides further evidence of the importance of General Grant’s advice to the Meiji government:
Grant’s warning that Japan should not become a debtor nation made a strong impression on the Emperor and other Japanese leaders for years to come. When the government sought ways to raise revenues in 1880, Councilor Okuma Shigenobu recommended that Japan acquire a foreign loan of fifty million yen from the British. Government leaders, unable to arrive at a final decision, sought the advice of the Emperor, who replied in an Imperial rescript: “While I know how difficult it is to balance the budget, I also know that it is quite wrong to float a foreign loan. Last year Grant spoke of the harm of foreign debts. His words are still fresh in my ears.”
General Grant’s suggestions for a more measured pace in extending suffrage and in creating a national legislature certainly concurred with the opinions of Ito, who played a critical role in drafting the 1890 Meiji Constitution, and other Japanese leaders. This “go slow” approach became the framework for the Japanese, who inaugurated a Diet with a very limited suffrage in the early 1890s and who did not grant universal male suffrage until 1925. It is interesting to note that shortly before the promulgation of the new constitution, the Emperor, who deliberated over drafts of the documents with his ministers, repeatedly said, “On this question Grant said…On that question Grant taught me…
Grant had urged that the Japanese adopt a more conciliatory approach on the Ryukyu question. Even though the Japanese did meet the Chinese at the negotiating table, no satisfactory settlement was ever made. The Japanese seizure of the islands and its creation of the new Okinawa Prefecture became a fait accompli. Grant’s greatest fear of a war between China and Japan, however, was postponed for another fifteen years, at which point Japan had emphati- cally become a major power that was in no danger at all of being cowed by any combination of world superpowers. The Japanese listened carefully to Grant’s suggestion that they should explore the possibilities of direct negotiations instead of waging a war that potentially could be disastrous to both sides.
Grant had expressed his and his country’s strong opposition with the tariff conventions that Japan had signed with the United States and other foreign countries. He argued that all foreign governments should be willing to renegotiate the treaties, giving the Japanese better terms. Grant’s words encouraged the Japanese to keep working to bring an end to the worst aspects of these “unequal treaties.” Unfortunately, the American government agreed to support treaty reform provided that the other powers followed suit, but none did, so any chance for meaningful reform failed for the next two decades.
Grant’s visit had positive intangible results as well. He made a very favorable impression on Japanese leaders, including the still young Emperor who seemed to gain a sense of confidence when dealing with foreigners. His praise for the rapid progress that the Japanese were making in their modernization efforts and for their industriousness, discipline, and organizational skills, drew a warm response. Grant’s warning that the Japanese should rely on themselves and not surrender any of their sovereignty to foreigners found its mark. But, above all, Grant’s open deep respect and affection for the Japanese left a very positive impression not only of him, but also of the United States.
Grant’s visit marked one of the high points of US-Japanese relations during the Meiji era. Grant was the perfect goodwill ambassador, portraying his country in a very favorable light while at the same time making the Japanese feel very good about themselves. Grant helped to considerably boost the self-confidence of the Japanese, making them realize that they could achieve wonders through their own initiatives, and that the international environment was not entirely hostile to their endeavors.
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