When the Native American’s were fighting the White man, the settlers sold them a few obsolete used Smith and Wessons (many with curved barrels, and dented eye-sights), but mostly it was Small Pox impregnated blankets and a lot of alcohol. A lot of alcohol. USA and Russia are now dumping substandard planes on India–While billions starve in South Asia, corrupt South Asian politicians are happily wasting away Billions, garnishing kickbacks, fooling an illiterate & emotional population with the mirage of military might, portending the triumphalist media’s farce of “Great power status”. Are the F-35s and the F-22s the Wild Wild West version of the guns, and the Nuclear agreements the blankets and the alcohol. All this with a lot of kickbacks. A lot of kickbacks. The Chinese ordered 250 kits of the Mig 29. After receiving 150 planes they canceled the order. At the point China became technologically independent and began manufacturing a superior version of the plane. Russia was angry at Russia but could not do anything. The Indian defense establishment has poured billions into fake research and development and then asked the country to purchase expensive useless toys from Russia and the West. The much heralded “Transfer of Technology (ToT) remains an elusive and ephemeral goal. Neither Russia nor the USA is either committed to commercial suicide. US corporations which exist for profit are not prone to economic and technologicalal hari kari–keep the illusion of “local manufacturing” alive, but are constrained by investor interests to really give up the “Coca Cola formula” to the Indians. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qKaiOu0gvU&feature=player_embedded http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5N0iXFN37iU&feature=player_embedded http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cORX4hdHEsg&feature=player_embedded There are several news items that lead us to analyze the defense procurement practices of the Indian establishment. 1) The 500th Flying Coffin of the Indian Airforce crashed a few weeks ago. This marked a world record for any Airforce. No other Airforce in the world has had so many crashes. Pilot error, equipment malfunction or just pure incompetence has led to this ignominious award to the IAF. 2) With the Indian embrace of Uncle Sam, Russia is peeved at the Indo-American relationship. Flush with Petro Dollars The Russian bear has is elided India in the development of new fighter jets and doubled the price of the aircraft Carrier that it is selling to New Delhi. 2) The Russians are now dumping a stripped down version of the Mig 29 to India without any participation in the development of the plane. Datapoints: Trials begin March 2009, and Indian Defense contractors will not be chosen ’till December 2008. Decision on which components to be made in India have yet to be decided. The new stripped down version of the Mig29 being sold to India has already been designed by Russia. In years gone by, during the post USSR era, the penury stricken Russian arms industry was looking for buyers. It found few. India sanctioned by the USA at the time plopped down billions. Now the world stage has changed. India is snuggling up to the Russian nemeses– the USA. According to press reports, the Russiansare not very keep on using India as equal design partners in airplane development projects. Russia wants Indian Dollars for supply of kits which it had agreed to during lean times. Designs for the PAK-FA have already been frozen by the Sukhoi design bureau, which means that Indian aircraft engineers have already missed out on the criticalknowledge curve of aircraft design. Also, the unequal status of the Indian and Russian aviation industries means India will be the junior partner contributing very little except finance. India Today. September 29th, 2008 The Indians were furious that the Russians flush with Petro Dollars were not participating in a joint design of the aircraft. According to reports the decibel level of the meeting was “frank” (diplomatic euphemism for direct yelling at each other) “So if we have missed out on the design phase, we have to analyse the cost-benefits of acquiring only super cruise and stealth technology for $ 10 billion,” asks Air Vice Marshal Kak. India Today. September 29th, 2008 3) The US has signed a “Nuclear Deal” with India which in effect actually forces India as part of the Nuclear Proliferation treaty (NPT) even though successive Indian Governments have refused to sign the NPT. The Nuclear dealalso prohibits India from ever testing a nuclear device with intrusive inspection of more than half of India’s nuclear plants and heavy monitoring of the new ones. The Indian Left is wise to the dance of of death with the USA, but the Indian National Congress has forged through– with a tango with the US defense contractors (very lucrative for the politicians in power). 4) The Indian Missile program (Trishul, Agni etc) is a total failure and is being scrapped and substituted by purchase of advanced missiles from Russia. 5) The Indian Main Battle Tank (MTB) is a colossal failure and India has admitted to it by purchasing 500 new T-90 russian tanks for more than 1 Billion Dollars. India’s main battle tank Project Arjun is, unfortunately, more flab than brawn. More a heavyweight than a performer. A potpourri really, with a French engine, and German seals fitted into an Indian hull and turret. And transporting this heavyweight is going to be another problem, which could limit its operational performance. Arjunwas basically planned as an ambitious project with complete indigenous components and assemblies. It has now been revealed that the Arjun’ssub-systems were all imported except for the hull and the turret. The imported assemblies includeall major sub-systems such as engine, transmission, track-suspension, gin and fire control. Our experts are of the view that their integration, “leaves much to be desired”. The auxiliary power unit from France did not perfectly fit in the tank, withthe German seals not meeting the GeneralStaff qualitative requirements of withstanding temperatures up to 150 degree Centigrade . The barely measured up to 120 degrees. Arjun is therefore quite a “khichri” withthe French engine, withGerman seals fitted into the Indian hull and turret mounting a not very accurate 120mm gunMajor General M. L. Popli (retd.) Full story: Arjun vs Al-Khalid main battle tanks 6) The Indian LCAfighter aircraft has been in development for more than a decade with no output. In normalcircumstances this would be considered a failed project. Now new engines have been ordered and the project has a perpetual life of its own. Like a Maruti which took a Fiat 124S and painted a huge Indian flag on it, the LCAwill emerge as in import with a tricolors painted on it. The F-35 is not a proven fighter design that has demonstrated a baseline of performance in service, however; it is a developmental aircraft in the early days of its test program, which is scheduled to continue until 2013. As one might expect, that status makes the F-35 a controversial long-term bet in many of the program’s member countries. The USA is looking at its budgets, and has concluded that it can afford about half of the annual aircraft buy it had planned during the program’s early years. Its fellow Tier 1 partner Britain is reportedly re-evaluating its planned F-35B order in light of rising costs and problematic defense budgets. Sharp controversy has erupted in Tier 2 partner the Netherlandsover long-term costs and industrial arrangements, leading to politicalpressure for a competitive bid. Tier 3 partners Norway and Denmark have both traveled down that same road, and are holding open competitions that pit the F-35 against Saab’s modernized JAS-39NG GripenSept 30th, 2008. Defense Industry Daily (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/The-F-35s-Air-to-Air-Capability-Controversy-05089/) Indian politicians corrupt to the core are mischievously selling the vision of “India as World power” to the illiterate emotion population and a triumphalist press to busy covering soft porn in Bollywoodto investigate the truth. On Sept 11/08, The Sydney Morning Herald reports that Australian Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has asked for a full report from Australia’s DoD, in response to public reports that a classified computer simulation of an attack by Russian-built SU-30 family aircraft on a mixed fleet of F-35As, Super Hornets and F-22s, had resulted in success for the Russian aircraft. Fitzgibbon, who questioned the strategic logic behind Australia’s plans for an F-35/ F-18F fighter fleet while in opposition, asked for anAustralian Department of Defence review, and added that: “I’m determined not to sign on the dotted line on the JSFuntil I am absolutely certain it’s capable of delivering the capability it promises and that capability can be delivered on time and on budget.” Sept 30th, 2008. Defense Industry Daily (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/The-F-35s-Air-to-Air-Capability-Controversy-05089/) 7) India is purchasing $10 Billion Dollars worth of aircraft from the USA. Part of the new fleet of Indian aircraft will be the American plane called the F-35 which is pure junk and has been unable to live up to any of its stated parameters. The ubiquitous criticism of the F-35 has led the USAF to cut the orders of the plane to half the original number. The Australians flying the plane are beyond furious. This analysis by Pierre M. Spey, a key member of the F-16 and A-10 design teams, cast sharp doubt on the F-35’s capabilities: “Even without new problems, the F-35 is a ‘dog.’ If one accepts every performance promise the DoDcurrently makes for the aircraft, the F-35 will be: “Overweight and underpowered: at 49,500 lb (22,450kg) air-to-air take-off weight with an engine rated at 42,000 lb of thrust, it will be a significant step backward in thrust-to-weight ratio for a new fighter…. [F-35A and F-35B variants] will have a ‘wing-loading’ of 108 lb per square foot…. less manoeuvrable than the appallingly vulnerable F-105 ‘Lead Sled’ that got wiped out over NorthVietnam…. payload of only two 2,000 lb bombs in its bomb bay…. With more bombs carried under its wings, the F-35 instantly becomes ‘non-stealthy’ and the DoD does not plan to seriously test it in this configuration for years. As a ‘close air support’… too fast to see the tactical targets it is shooting at; too delicate and flammable to withstand ground fire; and it lacks the payload and especially the endurance to loiter usefully over US forces for sustained periods…. What the USAF will not tell you is that ‘stealthy’ aircraft are quite detectable by radar; it is simply a question of the type of radar and its angle relative to the aircraft…. As for the highly complex electronics to attack targets in the air, the F-35, like the F-22 before it, has mortgaged its success on a hypothetical vision of ultra-long range, radar-based air-to-air combat that has fallen on its face many times in real air war. The F-35’s air-to-ground electronics promise little more than slicker command and control for the use of existing munitions.” Sept 30th, 2008. Defense Industry Daily (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/The-F-35s-Air-to-Air-Capability-Controversy-05089/) END OF ARTICLE APPENDIX A FOR REFERENCE AND DETAILS ON THE F-35 farce The F-35’s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy 29-Sep-2008 20:28 EDT F-35AF-35A test flight The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter/ Lightning II program is reaching a criticalnexus. In order to keep costs under control and justify the industrial ramp up underway, participating countries need to sign order agreements within the next year or so. The F-35 is not a proven fighter design that has demonstrated a baseline of performance in service, however; it is a developmental aircraft in the early days of its test program, which is scheduled to continue until 2013. As one might expect, that status makes the F-35 a controversial long-term bet in many of the program’s member countries. The USA is looking at its budgets, and has concluded that it can afford about half of the annual aircraft buy it had planned during the program’s early years. Its fellow Tier 1 partner Britain is reportedly re-evaluating its planned F-35B order in light of rising costs and problematic defense budgets. Sharp controversy has erupted in Tier 2 partner the Netherlandsover long-term costs and industrial arrangements, leading to politicalpressure for a competitive bid. Tier 3 partners Norway and Denmark have both traveled down that same road, and are holding open competitions that pit the F-35 against Saab’s modernized JAS-39NG Gripen. Australia hasn’t yet reached that point, but September 2008 has featured a very public set of controversies around the F-35’s performance. In the current environment, the altercation in Australia has become a controversy with implications, and responses, that have reached well beyond that continent’s shores…. * F-35: September 2008’s Australian Altercation * F-35: Air to Air Analyses * Additional Readings F-35: September 2008’s Australian Altercation AIR_F-111_and_F-18_RAAF.jpgThe current roster On Sept 11/08, The Sydney Morning Herald reports that Australian Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has asked for a full report from Australia’s DoD, in response to public reports that a classified computer simulation of an attack by Russian-built SU-30 family aircraft on a mixed fleet of F-35As, Super Hornets and F-22s, had resulted in success for the Russian aircraft. Fitzgibbon, who questioned the strategic logic behind Australia’s plans for an F-35/ F-18F fighter fleet while in opposition, asked for anAustralian Department of Defence review, and added that: “I’m determined not to sign on the dotted line on the JSFuntil I am absolutely certain it’s capable of delivering the capability it promises and that capability can be delivered on time and on budget.” On Sept 12/08, Australia’s opposition Liberal Party waded into the fray in support of its previous decision to buy the F-35A. It asked the new minister to release the results of the recent Air Combat Capability Review, and geton withhis decision. On Sept 25/08, the RAND Corporation stepped in with a statement of their own concerning the August 2008 Pacific Vision simulation: “Recently, articles have appeared in the Australian press with assertions regarding a war game in which analysts from the RAND Corporation were involved. Those reports are not accurate. RAND did not present any analysis at the war game relating to the performance of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, nor did the game attempt detailed adjudication of air-to-air combat. Neither the game nor the assessments by RAND in support of the game undertook any comparison of the fighting qualities of particular fighter aircraft” The end result left the Australian controversy without much substance. Even so, the timing of this contretemps could not have been worse from Lockheed Martin’s perspective. Just 3 days earlier, the left-wing American Center for Defense Information had released “Joint Strike Fighter: The Latest Hotspot in the U.S. Defense Meltdown.” This analysis by Pierre M. Spey, a key member of the F-16 and A-10 design teams, cast sharp doubt on the F-35’s capabilities: “Even without new problems, the F-35 is a ‘dog.’ If one accepts every performance promise the DoDcurrently makes for the aircraft, the F-35 will be: “Overweight and underpowered: at 49,500 lb (22,450kg) air-to-air take-off weight with an engine rated at 42,000 lb of thrust, it will be a significant step backward in thrust-to-weight ratio for a new fighter…. [F-35A and F-35B variants] will have a ‘wing-loading’ of 108 lb per square foot…. less manoeuvrable than the appallingly vulnerable F-105 ‘Lead Sled’ that got wiped out over NorthVietnam…. payload of only two 2,000 lb bombs in its bomb bay…. With more bombs carried under its wings, the F-35 instantly becomes ‘non-stealthy’ and the DoD does not plan to seriously test it in this configuration for years. As a ‘close air support’… too fast to see the tacticaltargets it is shooting at; too delicate and flammable to withstand ground fire; and it lacks the payload and especially the endurance to loiter usefully over US forces for sustained periods…. What the USAF will not tell you is that ‘stealthy’ aircraft are quite detectable by radar; it is simply a question of the type of radar and its angle relative to the aircraft…. As for the highly complex electronics to attack targets in the air, the F-35, like the F-22 before it, has mortgaged its success on a hypothetical vision of ultra-long range, radar-based air-to-air combat that has fallen on its face many times in real air war. The F-35’s air-to-ground electronics promise little more than slicker command and control for the use of existing munitions.” On Sept 18/08, Lockheed Martin fired back in “F-35: Setting the Record Straight.” It takes direct aim at both the Australian press reports, and the CDIarticle, noting that external weapons clearance is part of the F-35’s current test program. Lockheed Martin added that: ”….The Air Force’s standard air-to-air engagement analysis model, also used by allied air forces to assess air-combat performance, pitted the 5th generation F-35 against all advanced 4th generation fighters in a variety of simulated scenarios…. In all F-35 Program Office and U.S. Air Force air-to-air combat effectiveness analysis to date, the F-35 enjoys a significant Combat Loss Exchange Ratio advantage over the current and future air-to-air threats, to include Sukhois…. In stealth combat configuration, the F-35 aerodynamically outperforms all other combat-configured 4th generation aircraft in top-end speed, loiter, subsonic acceleration and combat radius. This allows unprecedented “see/shoot first” and combat radius advantages. The high thrust-to-weight ratios of the lightweight fighter program Wheeler/Sprey recall from 30 years ago did not take into consideration combat-range fuel, sensors or armament… We do consider all of this in today’s fighters…. ….Simply put, advanced stealth and sensor fusion allow the F-35 pilot to see, target and destroy the adversary and strategic targets in a very high surface-to-air threat scenario, and deal with air threats intent on denying access—all before the F-35 is ever detected, then return safely to do it again.” Note that Lockheed Martin’s release does not address infared stealth against modern IRST (infa-red scan and track) air to air systems, which are present on advanced European and Russian designs and have ranges up to 70km. Nor does it make any claims concerning superior maneuverability against thrust-vectoring opponents like Russia’s MiG-29OVT and the most modern members of the SU-30 family, or canard-equipped “4.5 generation” aircraft like the Dassault Rafale, EADS Eurofighter, or Saab’s Gripen. F-35: Air to Air Analyses AIR F-35 Left Wingover Rear ViewF-35A #AA-1 Both the CDI’s analysis, and Lockheed Martin’s reply, are incomplete. Spey has undertaken a similar analysis of the F-22A Raptor for CDI, but aircraft pilots have said that his analysis in key areas like maneuverability is poorly done, and does not match provable reality. This justifies strong caution in accepting Spey’s analysis, and Lockheed Martin’s reply offers additional reasons for doubt. In fairness to Spey, it should also be said that combat experience with his A-10 aircraft in Afghanistan et. al. does back up his contentions concerning the limitations of fast jets, and the capabilities required for close air support. In the F-22’s case, reasons could be advanced to explain why Spey’s F-22 analysis parameters were wrong, such as the F-22’s thrust vectoring and controllable tail surfaces to offset Spey’s unidimensional wing loading analysis, the tacticalimplicationsof having the ability to cruise above Mach 1 without afterburners, and stealththat has defeated AWACS aircraft and worked against internationalfighter pilots even at relatively short ranges. F-22 pilots have also racked up incredibly lopsided kill ratios in American and international exercises, far in excess of “normal” performance for new aircraft, that back up their pilots’ performance claims. This is all much harder to do for the F-35, which remains a developmental aircraft and lacks key aerodynamic features like combat thrust vectoring (Harrier, SU-30 family, MiG-29OVT, F-22A), canards for fast “point and shoot” manevers with high off-boresight short-range missiles (some SU-30 family, Rafale, Eurofighter, Gripen), or loaded supersonic cruise (F-22A). The F-35 has also been designed from the outsetto feature less stealth than the F-22A, though it will be stealthier than contemporary 4.5 generation European and Russian aircraft. Aircraft intake size and hence volume are set unless the aircraft is redesigned, and wing size, angle and loading can all be observed. AIR SU-30MKI Eurofighter Tornado-F3Indra Dhanush: SU-30MKI, Eurofghter, Tornado F3 The F-35’s explicit design goal has been stated as being the F-16’s equal in in air to air combat, at a time when the F-16’s future ability to survive in that arena is questioned. The question naturally arises: what special features give the F-35 a unique ability to prevail against the kind of advanced, upgraded 4.5 generation and better fighters that it can be expected to face between its induction, and a likely out of service date around 2050 or later? Classified simulations whose assumptions are shielded from the public may indeed demonstrate the attested results, but their foundations are outside any public scrutiny, and amount to a claim that must be taken on faith. That may not be very convincing in the political sphere. Especially since models of this type have been wrong before, due to the well-known phenomenon of incorrect or missing assumptions producing results that don’t match the test of battle. Ultimately, solid proof comes from use in combat against peer opponents. Israel’s nuclear program removed that perennial testing ground, by ending the consistent string of conventional wars that used to be the globe’s top source for that kind of information. Nor has any other source for that kind of peer conflict data emerged since the 1990s. If the F-35 lacks that kind of backing, well, so do all of its competitors. These days, an imperfect but acceptable substitute may be available via performance in multinational exercises like Red Flag or Indra Dhanush, where some of the opponents will have less institutional incentive to soft-pedal comparative performance claims in the name of a united organizational front. F-35B STOVL LandingX-35B STOVL The F-35 does have the equivalent of a Sniper ATP reconnaissance and targeting pod built in, and experience on the front lines indicates that its presence goes significantly beyond just “slicker command and control for the use of existing munitions.” That addresses an important component of the F-35’s overall rationale – but it does not address the air to air dimension. As it happens, that air to air dimension will not be a priority for every customer. Some customers may be quite satisfied witha manned fighter that offers good international/NATO commonality, the ability to perform basic airspace sovereignty duties, good survivability against medium to advanced air defenses if encountered, off the shelf surveillance and targeting capabilities that exceed all other contemporary fighters, and the ability to carry enough weapons to support international missions against opponents up to the level of Serbia or al-Qaeda and the Taliban. For those countries, even an F-35 that matched Spey’s characterization might well suffice. Questions of industrial benefits and costs, rather than air to air capabilities, will dominate fighter replacement discussions in those countries. The F-35 program has already seen a 54.4% increase in overall program costs per aircraft delivered from 2001 to the present day, and the US GAO believes that another 14.5% rise to about $327 billion for 2,456 American fighters could still lie ahead. If the GAO is correct, it would place the fully-loaded program cost of each F-35 at $137 million . That price is not at all the same as the “flyway cost” of buying an individual aircraft, but it does affect program partners if the USA isn’t prepared to bear those additional program costs alone. Or if rising costs force the USA to slash its own procurement numbers yet again, a move that would affect the aircraft’s production economies of scale and learning curves. Budgetary and industrialconcerns will always be part of the debate, but some customers may also have stricter performance requirements to deal with. If a country needs aircraft to operate from small aircraft carriers or amphibious assault LHDs, the AV-8 Harrier’s age and projected phase-out plans will make the F-35B STOVL(Short Take Off, VerticalLanding) their only non-Russian option. Customers in this category include the US Marine Corps, Italy, Spain, Thailand, and others. Very large LHDs, or small carriers equipped with ski-jumps, may also allow some competition from the less flexible STOBAR (Short Take Off But Assisted Recovery) MiG-29K, which India’s navy plans to induct by 2011 or so. For those customers, the choice boils down to having fighter jet launch capability from those platforms – or not. F-35CUS Navy F-35C On the flip side, if maintaining regionalor localair superiority is a priority mission for any replacement fighter, then air to air performance against enemy aircraft becomes extremely important. This is certainly true for the US Navy’s carrier fleet, for Australia’s RAAF, and to a lesser extent for the future British Navy. With these customers, Lockheed Martin must either depend on politicalinertia, or advance plausible, non-classified rationales that explain why its F-35s will perform as an air superiority fighter. Australia may have been the first potential customer to raise the issue this openly in the political sphere; it is unlikely to be the last. What’s common to every potential F-35 customer, of course, is the time factor. Competitively tested performance, and firm costs, are still some years away. Even so, many defense departments around the world will need to make decisions before that evidence becomes available. Hence the current political conundrums in country after country, and the tension that inevitably surrounds any program of this size before key commitments are made. As Aviation Week’s Bill Sweetman puts it: “If the JSFprogram succeeds in locking up its international partners, the project could be within reach of its goal of an F-16-like, mid-four-digit production run…. But if JSFfalls short of its goals – as almost every major military aircraft program has in the past 25 years – it will throw the re-equipment plans of a dozen air arms into disarray.”
Courtesy: Rupee News
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